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Abstract:  
This article aims to disturb the received wisdom ‘tidy house, tidy mind’ by tracing its 
emergence and consolidation: from psychoanalysis to clinical psychology through to 
philosophy and reality television. The contention here is that the commanding 
presence of the mirror as a clinical apparatus serves to eclipse a full consideration of 
the hoarding situation as one involving not only mental health professionals and 
clients, i.e. ‘hoarders’, but also the materials of the heap – as the ‘hoard’ is read 
straightforwardly as a reflection of the hoarder’s mind. It is argued, further, that the 
conspicuous neglect of things, i.e. material objects, in the modelling of the hoarding 
‘problem’ – the aetiology of Hoarding Disorder is cast in entirely human terms – 
serves to frame ‘hoarders’ as individually culpable. By extending the forensic logic of 
both clinical and popular psychology, it is argued that such framing amounts to 
securing forced confessions, where hoarders are left to bear total responsibility for a 
situation, which is, ultimately, a question of distributed agency between human and 
nonhuman entities.  
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Introduction 
 
Psychotherapist: ‘The environment we live in is a reflection of how we feel 
inside.’ 
‘Hoarder’: ‘It’s very complicated, that one. Very complicated.’1 
 
With the publication of fifth edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V®) (2013), a number 
of conditions categorized previously under the heading of Obsessive Compulsive 
Personality Disorder appear as discrete illnesses. Whilst Internet Gaming Disorder is 
bracketed as a Section III condition requiring further investigation before inclusion, 
the separate listing of Hoarding Disorder is justified on the grounds that it is ‘a 
distinct disorder with distinct treatments’ (American Psychiatric Association, 2013a: 
1). Further, given that an estimated ‘two to five percent of the population’ is held to 
suffer from Hoarding Disorder, the aim in isolating it as a specific condition is to 
offer more ‘effective intervention and support for sufferers and their families’ (ibid). 
 
For viewers of lifestyle television and, especially, of hoarding reality shows such as 
Hoarding: Buried Alive, Hoarders, Storage Hoarders, Collectaholics, America’s 
Animal Hoarder: Horror at the Zoo, Extreme Car Hoarders and The Horse Hoarder, 
the idea of hoarding as constituting a specific condition warranting technical and 
therapeutic management will come as no surprise.2 For a number of years now 
(roughly since the late 1990s) the cluttered domestic interior has been construed, 
precisely, as a symptom, requiring professional intervention and treatment. Framed as 
a form of addiction necessitating diagnosis, (often 12-step) treatment and 
rehabilitation, individualized culprits are taken to task for their abject living 
conditions and, further, set straight by a specialist team usually comprised of 
psychologists together with professional cleaners and organisers. Audiences, 
meanwhile, are trained to be on the lookout for the thin-end-of-the-wedge, tell-tale 
signs that they too might yield to the temptation to hoard. This shading of 
pathological behaviour into everyday practice is responsible for much of the frisson of 
hoarding reality television; as it is encoded in the title and premise of a popular 
British reality series: The Hoarder Next Door 3, and in self-help books such as The 
Hoarder in You: How to Live a Happier, Healthier, Uncluttered Life (Zasio, 2012) 
hoarding is a too-close-for-comfort phenomenon.  
Central to the drama of hoarding, in both clinical and pop cultural presentations, is the 
idea of reflection: of the mess as an extravagant projection of the hoarder’s mind, and 
hence of flawed mental processes (decision-making, sorting etc.), or else as a result of 
the introjection of a traumatic event, which finds external, material expression in 
hoarding behaviours. The spectacular heap of things that forms the customary mis-en-
scene of hoarding reality television thus serves as a magnificent, above all, visible 
symptom of a spectacular breakdown on the part of its owner. Either way, the hoard, 
together with and its constituent clutter, becomes reduced to the status of a mirror 
throwing back a portrait of its perverse engineer.  
 
Crucially, given its clinical classification as a behavioural addiction, Hoarding 
Disorder is ripe for a programme of behaviour modification (Skeggs 2009: 635) and 
for the lessons dispensed by reality television. Questions of what and what not to wear 
and eat, how not to raise children and deal with pets are resolved through the 
imposition of strict disciplinary techniques and protocols, where desired results are 
dramatised and made visible during the course of the particular show. Here the mirror 
works to verify cure, as successful treatment is discernible in readily observable 
changes in behaviour. In the case of hoarding and cluttering behaviours, newly 
disciplined housekeeping practices – evidenced in a newly disciplined and tidy house 
– are read as confirmation of therapeutic triumph: the ‘issues’ that lie beneath the 
hoard are brought to the surface and are seen to evaporate with exposure to the light 
of day.  
This article aims to challenge the analogy between domestic and psychological 
interiors that informs popular and clinical presentations of cluttering and hoarding 
behaviours. Psychologised versions of the folk wisdom ‘tidy house, tidy mind’ can be 
seen to masquerade as knowledges, as the state of the home becomes readable as a 
trustworthy indicator of the state of mind of its occupant, begetting new 
commonplaces and stock ideas: ‘mess equals stress,’ 4 for instance, or CHAOS (Can’t 
Have Anyone Over Syndrome) (Cilley and Ely, 2006: xviii). What is especially 
noteworthy in the analogous treatment of house and mind is that a degree of 
translation – in Bruno Latour’s sense of the word as ‘displacement, drift, invention, 
mediation’ (1994: 32) – can be discerned between the clinical and cultural realms, in 
that the boundaries between medical and self-help advice are, at times, quite fluid, 
making the border between popular and professional contexts unclear. With some 
clinicians writing self-help guides (Frost and Steketee, 2011) and others appearing on 
reality shows as resident psychologists (Zasio, 2012) the traffic between clinic and 
culture is far from a one-way street, resulting in an often blurred presentation of 
diagnostic criteria in both settings. While popular psychology can be seen to draw 
much of its authority from the clinic, it is equally the case that clinicians make use of 
popular forms, such as reality television to support their endeavour to establish a solid 
evidence base for the objective existence of Hoarding Disorder, which is, further, 
primed to be scientifically investigated with the apparatus of the DSM (see Frost and 
Steketee, 2014). The publication of textbooks aimed at both mental health researchers 
and practitioners (Frost and Steketee, 2014; Bratiotis et al. 2011) purport to respond to 
the straightforward need for more information on hoarding behaviours. Crucially, the 
event of DSM-V alongside conspicuous media interest in hoarding is said to have 
precipitated the demand for a dedicated volume on the subject as part of the Oxford 
Library of Psychology series (Frost and Steketee, 2014: 3), making for an 
intensification of the dealings between culture and clinic.  
 
Far from validating the science of professional investigations into hoarding, however, 
it is the contention here that the consolidation of house/mind thinking in hoarding 
reality television and in clinical instruments such as the Home Environment Inventory 
(HEI), the Clutter Image Rating (CIR) (Bratiotis et al. 2011) – which rely on an 
optical, pictorial measurement scale – produces an inadequate science. The trouble 
with both mind and house doctors – psychologists and lifestyle gurus – as they survey 
the houses of their case studies is that they drastically underplay the material 
entanglement of human with nonhuman life. The aetiology of Hoarding Disorder, in 
its clinical expression, is an entirely human affair, taking in dysfunctional and 
maladaptive behaviours such as excessive emotional attachment to what are seen to 
be inert material objects, deficits in the ability to process information and affective 
disorders, expressed in an inability to form successful social relationships (Frost and 
Steketee, 2014: 4). Similarly, popular psychology, as it manifests in hoarding reality 
television, relies on a standard narrative of projection and/or introjection in that 
hoarders are required both to confess their disorder and admit to some sort of 
traumatic event, which is granted a causative function. Put simply, the situation of 
hoarding, as clinical and popular psychologists construe it, is lacking contribution 
from a crucial group: the members of the hoard, that is, the things themselves. The 
objects, things and substances that constitute the hoard are figured as little more than 
a sign or symptom of their host’s disorder, and, as such, are spirited away. 
The dominating presence of the mirror as a diagnostic tool thus serves to eclipse a full 
consideration of the hoarding situation as one involving not only psychoanalyst/life 
coach/storage guru and analysand/client/slob but also the materials of the heap. As a 
result, psychic reflections bounce off every surface leaving the occupant of the 
cluttered house caught in the glare of a therapeutic gaze, which is difficult to escape. 
Hoarders, it will be argued, are held solely to account for a situation that they 
contribute to only in part; the reduction of the complex material dimensions of living 
and dwelling to what Karen Barad terms ‘representationalist logic’ (2003: 825), as the 
state of the home is taken to stand for that of the mind, has the effect of riding 
roughshod over questions of agency, not least, the agency of nonhumans.  
 
The work of providing a more object-oriented (Bogost, 2012) account of hoarding as 
a social and cultural phenomenon is already in progress, most notably in Jane 
Bennett’s expansion of her Vibrant Matter project, which involves theorising ‘the call 
of things’ and the ‘the nonhuman powers of the hoard’ (2011). Bennett’s notion of 
‘thing-power’, that is, ‘the curious ability of inanimate things to animate, to act, to 
produce effects dramatic and subtle’ (2010: 6), issues a serious challenge to a cultural 
imaginary that posits fully-fledged and separate human beings immersed in a world of 
inert objects, objects that they are obliged to segregate from or sweep aside in order to 
qualify as human at all. For Bennett, those labelled as hoarders have a unique 
contribution to make to a consideration of the manner in which ‘human being and 
thinghood overlap’ (2010: 31). ‘Preternaturally attuned to the call of things’ (2011), 
hoarders can potentially allow for a refinement of questions of agency as distributive 
and as something dispersed across divisions of human and nonhuman, subject and 
object, culture and nature. The phenomenon of hoarding, then, permits an extensive 
investigation, via an eccentric, sideways route, into the profound capacity of things, 
substances and vitalities to both attract and repel and to form assemblages with human 
and nonhuman accomplices. Above all, Bennett insists that the call of the hoard, the 
figurative elephant in the room, ought to be taken seriously, which means resisting 
judgement and meeting ‘hoarders’ ‘not as bearers of a mental illness but as differently 
abled bodies that might have special sensory access to the call of things’ (2011). By 
pulling focus and pushing things into the foreground and people into the background 
Bennett hopes to disarm the psychosocial dominance of explanatory frameworks 
around hoarding, augmenting the conversation around the co-constitutive nature of 
human and nonhuman being in the process. 
 
To allow this conversation to flourish, however, some supplementary work is needed. 
Bennett’s appeal to take the call of things seriously is, by her own admission, easier 
said than done when it comes to amplifying the voices of hoarders in relation to their 
heaps and assemblages. It matters little, for those snagged in the diagnostic apparatus 
of Hoarding Disorder, that they apprehend the power of the material world, that they 
appreciate the complexity of the stuffliness of life, as Bennett well knows: to imply 
that ‘the things did it’ (2011) potentially compounds what is construed, in advance, to 
be a pathological relationship to the objects in question. Equally, as it is routinely 
evidenced in the pronouncements of experts in the face of the ‘hoard’, any attempt by 
the ‘hoarder’ to articulate any defence other than that of full culpability – and 
confirmation of the truth of the diagnostic framework – is met with stubborn refusal. 
As it will become clear, those who try to speak up for their things are usually 
castigated for choosing objects over people (frogs, penguins and banana skins over a 
live-in boyfriend, in the case of one episode of Hoarders5) or, otherwise, for being in 
a state of denial. Indeed, pictorial instruments such as the Clutter Image Rating were 
specifically developed to provide an allegedly objective measure as a means of 
overcoming the problem of denial in client assessments of their own clutter. In the 
words of The Hoarding Handbook: ‘A discrepancy in ratings in which the clinician’s 
ratings are substantially higher than the client’s suggests low insight and limited 
capacity for self-motivated treatment’ (Bratiotis 2011: 62-3). 
 
Producing the kind of shift that Bennett and other object-oriented thinkers intend, 
toward a distributed sense of agency between humans and nonhumans, relies on 
disrupting – decisively and fundamentally – the optical apparatus that secures the 
portrait of the hoarder’s mind as visibly disordered. The subsequent work of this 
paper will be directed, then, toward the representationalist thinking infects the way 
that the domestic interior is conceived – far and beyond psychoanalytic ideas – to 
form a recalcitrant, powerfully normative cultural logic around living and dwelling. 
The omnipresence of house/mind thinking can be traced in early psychoanalytic 
writings, through the diagnostic apparatuses of the DSM, the philosophical and 
literary imagination and into popular cultural forms such as detective fiction. More, 
analogies, homologies and reflections abound even in the work of psychoanalysts 
who attempt to account for artifacts and objects as more than reflections of human 
intentions. Both Adam Phillips (2000) and Donald Winnicott (2005) apprehend the 
messiness of things as a productive feature of everyday life and as part of a healthy, 
i.e. good-enough psychic milieu. Neither goes far enough, though, in his figuration of 
object relations and both tend to reduce the thing-world to the status of a props 
cupboard dedicated entirely to human drama.  
 
What follows contrasts a Foucauldian genealogical approach with the kinds of 
historical presentations that dominate professional handbook literatures, which tend to 
offer smooth teleological accounts of the development of hoarding stretching from 
mediaeval times to the present – often folding in fictional examples indiscriminately 
(See Penzel (2014) for a stark example) or else, on a micrological level, identifying 
personal history as the motivation for sentimental attachment to things (Bratiotis, et 
al. 2011: 14). Foucault’s method seeks to undermine any notion of an inexorable rise 
of any universal behaviour, whether sexuality or madness or criminality, by 
emphasising a history that denaturalises rather than consolidates, that sabotages rather 
than buttresses scientific ambition (1984: 87) The certainties of the human sciences 
are thus reconfigured as ‘organised discourse[s] or apparatus[es] for constructing and 
controlling human subjects’ (Crowley, 2009: 342), allowing for a consideration of the 
conditions of emergence of particular discourses, instruments and knowledges in any 
given historical period. The kind of history that Foucault is talking about directly 
contradicts the curiously history-less history of official accounts, which base their 
‘judgments on an apocalyptic objectivity…[and a] belief in eternal truth, [and] the 
immortality of the soul ’ (Foucault, 1984: 87). Genealogy, with its ‘suprahistorical 
perspective’ promises to deflate the dream of ‘objective science’ (ibid). 
 
This is no small matter. Given the increasing appeal to scientific truth of both clinical 
and popular presentations of Hoarding Disorder, especially as the apparatus becomes 
more reliant on neuropsychological modelling and the alibi of MRI imaging, the need 
to offer a more wavering, contingent, above all, nuanced portrait of hoarding is 
certain. This is still more pressing considering the normative judgment – often 
admitted in clinical writings – involved in determining so-called healthy ways of 
dealing with the stuffliness of life (see Frost and Steketee, 20014: 4). The drastic 
underestimation of social and cultural forces – the clamorous insistence of consumer 
culture is one conspicuous absence in much clinical and popular explanation – 
together with the overestimation of behavioural and neurobiological models in 
hoarding situations produces a scene, which is only partly conclusive. Obtaining 
confessions from hoarders without any consideration of all of the actants involved in 
the situation of hoarding – humans and nonhumans alike – is, then, the equivalent of 
gathering inadmissible evidence. Conspicuous in their absence from any enquiry, the 
material elements of the hoard are reduced to mere projections of disorderly minds 
and thus escape attention leaving their human partners to bear full responsibility for 
what is, in essence, an unruly assemblage. Anyone who has ever allowed the 
washing-up to stack up or has mislaid their keys in a random pile of stuff ought to be 
familiar not only with the seemingly magnetic power of mess to proliferate and but 
also with the energy it takes to maintain order. Or to frame things in terms of 
Bennett’s articulation of assemblages, the agency of the assemblage is such that 
humans can seldom be seen to be in control of anything. She elaborates:  
 
Assemblages are not governed by any central head: no materiality or type of 
material has sufficient competence to determine consistently the trajectory or 
impact of the group. The effects generated by an assemblage are, rather, 
emergent properties, emergent in that their ability to make something 
happen… is distinct from the sum of the vital force of each materiality 
considered alone. Each member and proto-member of the assemblage has a 
certain vital force, but there is also an effectivity proper to the grouping as 
such: an agency of the assemblage. (2010: 23-4) 
 
In short, without considering all members of the assemblage, practitioners are 
securing forced confessions: with hoarders being collared for crimes that they could 
not have committed without an accessory. 
 
The extended metaphor of forced confession is by no means a casual turn of phrase 
and is appropriated explicitly from the forensic emphasis of contemporary hoarding 
reality television. Before moving on to provide a genealogy of house/mind thinking, 
detailing its emergence in early psychoanalysis, it would be useful to pause to take in 
some hoarding TV in order to more fully appreciate the extent to which the house is 
seen to snitch on its inhabitants, establishing the domestic interior as utterly revealing 
of interior mental life. 
 
Domestic forensics 
The forensic framing of domestic space can be seen in everything from the pop 
science of the CSI franchise to advertising campaigns for cleaning products: where 
toilets speak behind their owner’s backs to guests (what does your loo say about 
you?) to popular gameshows like Through the Keyhole, where panellists attempt to 
guess the identity of celebrities as they are revealed through the clues given by their 
homes.6 Indeed, the prevalence of forensics in popular media has led Lindsay 
Steenberg to identify ‘a forensic turn’ (2013: 1), where ‘a mediated version of 
forensic science has embedded itself in American culture’s foundational views about 
truth, criminality, professionalism and victimhood, and the contemporaneous surge in 
forensic entertainment’ (ibid). While evidence for the forensic turn can be found most 
readily in TV crime drama, the drift of a forensic gaze is, as Steenberg observes, 
discernable in lifestyle media. From makeover TV to lifestyle cookbooks, forensic 
evidence is relied upon to support all manner of judgements and adjudications of 
myriad ‘failed’ and mismanaged lifestyles.  
 
The case of hoarding reality TV can be seen to present its own subgenre of forensic 
pop psychology, where tropes drawn from police procedurals, such as evidence 
gathering, interrogation and laboratory work, frequently structure the narrative 
presentation of each particular ‘case’. Indeed the presentation of each ‘hoard’ as a 
case, establishes from the outset a hermeneutic logic, offering the viewer, as with 
detective fiction, a puzzle to solve – a mess to clear up – by the end of the show. An 
especially camp performance of domestic forensics is viewable in the British 
cleaning-entertainment programme How Clean Is Your House, where ‘grime-busters’ 
or ‘dirt detectives’ Kim Woodburn and Aggie Mackenzie isolate ‘grime-scenes’ 
(complete with do not cross police barrier tape), collect microbial swabs for lab 
analysis and interrogate suspects accused of various ‘filth offences’.7 Offenders are, 
then, subjected to an intervention on the part of a clean-up squad and placed under a 
treatment programme designed to restore domestic competency by instilling a 
corrective set of housekeeping practices.  
 
The majority of de-cluttering/cleaning/hoarding shows offer a far sterner version of 
the genre. Aggie Mackenzie’s latest television vehicle Storage Hoarders, for instance, 
where participants reveal the cluttered contents of their self-storage units, advocates 
ruthlessness as a way of life when it comes to dealing with even the most 
sentimentally charged things. 8Treated as a form of outsourced repression, with ‘serial 
hoarders’ depositing items that are too painful to deal with, whilst paying for the 
privilege, storage ‘users’ (the resonance with the drug users is deliberate and 
pronounced forcefully) are taken to task for holding onto emotional baggage. One 
participant, for example, is said to have spent £1265 over a period of eight months to 
‘keep her memories on ice’ after the sudden death of her partner. The intervention of 
professional declutterers, called in to help sort out what is framed as a hoarding 
problem, is, then, justified on the grounds of lending emotional support for the 
moment when the unit is opened and the ‘past’ is revealed: ‘inside this unit are the 
memories of a shared life…I want to be there to support her as she downsizes her box 
of memories.’ The drama of the moment that the memory-box is ‘prize[d] open…to 
see what the past reveals’ is further heightened by close-ups of the unit’s owner’s 
reaction as she exclaims, affirming the show’s diagnostic framework: ‘Oh God…the 
memories…’ The ‘past’ is further sorted into the show’s constituent categories: skip 
(i.e. throw away), keep, sell and charity, with the ultimate aim of ‘saying goodbye’ to 
it (not before sending what are perceived to be valuable items to auction). Here the 
ruthless attack on the material world is at its most evident. Not only is the conflation 
of stuff with the past complete: ‘we see how Francois’ past performs under the 
hammer’, the dematerialisation of memory is powerfully asserted: ‘downsizing 
doesn’t mean erasing the past. Memories are kept in our hearts, not in the bottom of a 
storage crate’. 
 
The Hoarder Next Door, similarly, presents a forensic framework, beginning with the 
resident psychologist sifting through the rubble of a particular hoard in search of clues 
to the specific trauma that will be held responsible for catalysing the participant’s 
hoarding behaviour (the item commonly selected being a family photograph): ‘we 
want to find out what’s underneath the hoard and what’s underneath you’.9 Regardless 
of the particularities of the stories that inform individual hoards, though, the narrative 
arcs essentially remain standard and can be traced throughout the subspecies of 
hoarding reality television. Each show tends to begin with crisis intervention, 
involving the exposure of a guilty secret: a team of experts, usually comprising 
psychologists, professional organisers and extreme cleaners, together with a camera 
crew enter the home of a subject deemed to have a hoarding problem. Some form of 
psychological evaluation follows, where a traumatic event is identified as the trigger 
of the hoarding behaviour: hoarders are construed as modern day Miss Havishams, 
stuck in the drama of painful events, unable to let go and move on. A treatment 
programme is set up, typically counselling in combination with organisational skills 
and household management training, as part of a rehabilitation narrative. As the hoard 
is viewed as manifesting traumatic memory, clearing the clutter is itself seen to be 
part of the treatment and so getting rid of the dusty wedding cake aspects of the hoard 
is framed as therapeutic. Hoarders are often encouraged to smash, shred or burn 
emotionally charged objects themselves or to visualise releasing their perceived 
toxicity as professionals remove them from the premises. All in all, the aim is to 
restore order and to ensure against future recidivism; to use the mock political 
correctness of How Clean is Your House, the ‘domestically challenged’ are set 
straight, impelled to clean up their acts and, above all, required to vow to stay clean. 
 
The restoration of domestic order as a sign of mental health has a long history and can 
be traced to the emergence of psychoanalysis itself. While the professionalised view 
of hoarding behaviours has tended to organise elements of this history to reinforce the 
veracity and truthfulness of the category of the ‘hoarder’ and to bolster scientific 
ambition (see Frost and Sketekee 2014), it is possible to push things the other way 
and to use history to dissolve some of the certainties of the forensic framework that 
secures the house and the mind as mirror images of one another. 
 
Psychoanalysis and the emergence of house/mind thinking 
As Adam Phillips notes in his essay on clutter, at the heart of psychoanalysis is an 
impulse to tidy: ‘Psychoanalytic theory – and, indeed, its highly ritualized practice – 
has an aversion to clutter’ (2000: 59-60). In much the same way that Mrs Darling in 
J.M. Barrie’s Peter Pan deals with the mess of her children’s minds, psychoanalysis 
attempts to bring meaning to the analysand’s mess of symptoms. In a mildly sinister 
passage, Barrie anticipates Freudian ideas as early as 1911: 
 
It is the nightly custom of every good mother after her children are asleep to 
rummage in their minds and put things straight for next morning, repacking 
into their proper places the many articles that have wandered during the 
day…. When you wake in the morning, the naughtiness and evil passions with 
which you went to bed have been folded up small and placed at the bottom of 
your mind and on the top, beautifully aired, are spread out the prettier 
thoughts, ready for you to put on. (2004: 8) 
 
In the case of psychoanalysis, though, any naughtiness or evil passion is placed less at 
the bottom of the mind than brought to the surface, exposed to the analyst’s gaze and 
folded away into a meaningful diagnostic and curative pattern. Or else, mysterious, 
preconscious processes sort things out unawares, as with Freud’s example of ‘when 
someone finds, immediately after waking, that he knows the solution to a difficult 
mathematical or other problem with which he had been wrestling in vain the day 
before’ (2001: 26) As evidenced, further, by the very notion of disorder, which 
operates as a codeword for pathology, the psychoanalytic project can, then, be 
summarized as one governed by ordering and sense-making activity.  
 
Early psychoanalytic approaches can be seen to converge with nineteenth century 
anxieties around consumer behaviour as the allure of consumer goods is taken to 
produce new forms of addiction and obsession (Dant, 1999) (Holliday and Potts, 
2012). Compulsive consumption in the form of extreme book collecting, for instance, 
is first documented – and importantly, medicalised – in 1809 with the publication of 
Dr John Ferrier’s The Bibliomania: An Epistle to Richard Heber, Esq. (Penzel, 2014) 
While a range of ‘diseases of the will’ coupled with ‘addict identities’ – such as 
kleptomaniacs and alcoholics – make their appearance as the century progresses 
(Sassatelli, 2007: 156). 
 
Not surprisingly, psychoanalysis takes the figure of the collector as one of its prime 
case studies, forging a powerful linkage between collecting and hoarding in the 
process. Fred Penzel (2014) outlines the history of hoarding as one involving three 
key analysts: Willliam James, Sigmund Freud and Ernest Jones, all of whom help to 
pathologise the practice of collecting. James’ The Principles of Psychology (2007) 
figures obsessive collecting and hoarding as vestigial instinctual activity akin to a 
kind of squirreling of resources in the anticipated event of harder times. James’ 
relation to hoarding is more complex than Penzel’s account admits though. On the 
one hand, such an impulse to hoard evidences James’ ‘mind-stuff theory’ (151), 
where the accumulation and aggregation of ‘primiordial units of mind-stuff or mind-
dust’ (146) is a key mechanism of evolutionary psychology and the development of 
higher forms of mentality. On the other, acquisitiveness and the desire to collect is 
framed as potentially pathological behaviour, that is, ‘blind impulse’ (290). What 
keeps such desires in check is the presence of rational deliberation: ‘Most people 
probably have the impulse to keep bits of useless finery, old tools, pieces of once 
useful apparatus, etc.; but it is normally either inhibited at the outset by reflection, or, 
if yielded to, the objects soon become displeasing and are thrown away’ (290).  
 
The significant event in the figuration of collecting/hoarding behavior as pathology, 
though, comes in the form of Sigmund Freud’s essay ‘Character and Anal Eroticism’ 
(2001a), which, likewise, takes collecting practices to be informed by instinctive 
impulses, only with a psychosexual twist. As Penzel (2014) notes, collectors are seen 
to display anal characteristics: parsimony, obstinacy and rigidity. In holding onto 
possessions, and sublimating his or her desires into things, the collector is considered 
to be stuck in a state of arrested development. Everything from ‘intense “burning” 
ambition’ to an interest in money finds its ‘formula’ in anal erotic impulses (ibid). 
 
Ernest Jones consolidates the identification of anal fixation as a key feature of the 
collector’s personality in his paper ‘Anal Erotic Character Traits’ (1923), adding the 
idea that the hobby is governed by an ‘impulse to gather, collect and hoard’ (cited in 
Penzel, 2014: 13) For Jones, the anal-eroticism of the collecting habit is manifest in 
the objects that the collector singles out for his affections: 
 
The objects collected are nearly always typical copro-symbols: thus money, 
coins (apart from current ones), stamps, eggs, butterflies – these two being 
associated with the idea of babies – books, and even worthless things like pins, 
old newspapers etc. (ibid) 
 
The collector projects and sublimates his anal fixation onto the material world, 
finding culturally respectable substitutions to cast in his psychosexual drama. The 
filth of the mind is, thus, tidied up and channelled into seemingly honourable and 
orderly pursuits – copro-symbols, nevertheless, which to the psychoanalytically 
trained eye provide a reflection of the collector’s anal-erotic inner life. 
 
Mirror-logic continues in Freud’s topography of the psyche, which, at least in its 
earliest drafts, offers an exemplary model of bourgeois tidiness with its – admittedly 
‘crude’ – analogy of the unconscious and preconscious mind with the domestic space 
of the hallway and drawing room (Malcolm, 2012: 29). Presided over by a 
‘watchman’, the threshold operates as a border between repressed and potentially 
conscious thought: the mental impulses that are admitted to the drawing room 
effectively enter the preconscious realm and await the attentions of the eye of 
consciousness located at the other end of the room. The job of the watchman is, 
consequently, to maintain the order of the preconscious, which acts as an antechamber 
for the conscious mind, the room of respectable, well-kept thought. 
 
 
Freud’s attempt to tidy the dreams of Carl Jung – into ‘something that suited his 
theories’ (1989: 160) – provided the decisive moment for Jung’s development of 
ideas such as the collective unconscious (and, ultimately, his departure from Freudian 
psychoanalysis). The dream in question, which Freud insisted was bound up with the 
death-wish, all the same, offers an exceptional instance of house/mind thinking. 
Dreaming of a house, Jung finds himself descending the stairs whilst going back in 
time: from the rococo period of the salon in the upper storey via the fifteenth century 
to the Roman times of the basement and eventually, through a trapdoor, into the 
primitive scene of a cave beneath the property. Resisting what he saw as Freud’s 
death obsessed interpretation, Jung sees the house as ‘a kind of image of the psyche.’ 
(ibid). He elaborates: 
 
Consciousness was represented by the salon… The ground floor stood for the 
first level of the unconscious. The deeper I went, the more alien and the darker 
the scene became. In the cave, I discovered remains of a primitive culture, that 
is, the world of the primitive man within myself – a world which can scarcely 
be reached or illuminated by consciousness.  
(ibid) 
 In contrast to Freud’s house/mind schema, the clutter of Jung’s scheme accrues in the 
upper floors, the space of consciousness, which are fussy and ornamental in style.  
 
If, for psychoanalysis, the mind is shaped like a house, it soon follows that the house 
is readable as a reflection of the mind. Just as Jung went on to build his dream house 
at Bollingen, on the shores of Lake Zurich – for him ‘a symbol of psychic wholeness’ 
(cited in Cooper Marcus, 1995: np) – so the idea of house design takes on 
psychological and even spiritual significance. Clare Cooper Marcus (1995), for 
instance, offers a Jungian approach to dwelling in The House As a Mirror of Self: 
Exploring the Deeper Meaning of Home, and, in the process, explores ‘the accounts 
of people who have learned to truly express who they are via their choice of house: by 
remodelling a dwelling as family needs change…by changing the décor after the end 
of a relationship, by coming to terms with the inevitable tensions between clutter and 
tidiness’ (np). As the ideal house takes on the architectural shape of psychological 
health and wellbeing, conversely, the dysfunctional house reflects its inhabitant’s 
dysfunction. For Marcus, those who become ‘stuck’, i.e. ‘excessive[ly] bond[ed] to 
one house or its contents’ betray unresolved issues with respect to their ‘relationship 
to home in childhood or to one parent in that home’ (np).  
 
Psychoanalysis, thus, helps to establish powerful analogies between material culture, 
the domestic interior and unconscious behaviour, many of which carry into 
contemporary diagnostic criteria around hoarding disorder. As Gail Steketee and 
Randy O. Frost (2014) note, Freudian notions of anality and parsimony inform the 
classification of Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder (OCPD) in the second 
edition of the DSM (see also Penzel, 2014). Hoarding behaviour then becomes an 
established diagnostic indicator for OCPD in DSM- III-R (Mataix Cols, et al. 2010). 
By the time of the publication of DSM-IV, the problem of letting go of ‘worn-out 
worthless objects even when they have no sentimental value’ (ibid) has become a 
constituent feature of OCPD, marking the consolidation of a linkage between holding 
onto material possessions with personality disorder. 
 
However, in the transition between DSM-IV and the most recent revision 
interventions from the field of cognitive neuroscience have served to pull hoarding 
away from psychodrama and toward neurobiological models. Mataix-Col et al., put it 
bluntly: ‘The syndrome is not solely a result of social deviance or conflicts in society’ 
(566). The development process for DSM-V took in research from neuroimaging 
studies, for instance, which aimed to establish a neural substrate for hoarding 
behaviour distinct from that of OCD and OCPD (Mataix-Cols. et al. 2010: 563). 
Significantly, elements of this research seek to establish homologies between animal 
behavioural patterns, such as nesting, burrowing, scatter-hoarding and stowing away 
food, with human hoarding practices: ‘The strongest evidence for a homology derives 
from the fact that the behaviour across species relies upon similar neural processes in 
the mesolimbocortical system’ (Preston, 2014: 188) Such research, taken together 
with models influenced by behavioural economics and other neuropsychological 
approaches, evidences a decisive move away from familial, social or cultural accounts 
of hoarding toward patterns of brain activity.  
 
In addition to revealing animal-like cognitive schemes, neural imaging also 
‘implicate[s] dysfunction of the anterior cingulate cortex and other ventral and medial 
prefrontal cortical areas that mediate decision-making, attention, and emotional 
regulation’ (Saxena, 2008: 297, my emphasis). Recent research thus places emphasis 
upon questions of organisation and data processing, seeing the hoard as visible 
evidence of ‘problems with categorisation, attention and decision making’ (ibid). 
With this, clutter becomes an information age problem, a volumetric indicator 
reflecting an equivalent heap of unmade decisions and uncategorised information. 
 
Moving beyond the clinic, the idea of hoarding as homological between human and 
nonhuman animals finds unlikely confirmation in Heideggerian notions of dwelling. 
Making a foundational distinction between human and animal, Heidegger determines 
dwelling as an act of excavation as opposed to the nesting, embedding tendencies of 
nonhumans. If animals enclose themselves in their environments, humans disclose, 
opening up spaces and pushing nature aside in the name of culture and civilisation. 
Tim Ingold summarises: 
 
…the space of dwelling is one that the [human] inhabitant has formed around 
himself by clearing the clutter that would otherwise threaten to overwhelm his 
existence (2011: 82).  
 
Human dwelling is contingent, then, on a process of unearthing and space clearing. 
 
In his more positive philosophical account of dwelling, Emmanuel Levinas 
establishes, nevertheless, the indivisibility of psychic and domestic space: in Totality 
and Infinity (1969) psychological interiority is predicated upon the space of home as a 
place of retreat from the harsh exteriority of the world. For Gaston Bachelard, 
likewise, ‘our soul is an abode’ (1994: xxxvii) and the poetics of the house resonate 
deeply with aspects of human psychology. Notions of shelter, dwelling, refuge, 
intimacy, secrecy, quietude, dreaming are materially expressed in the built 
environment, giving rise to the need for what he terms ‘topo-analysis’: ‘On whatever 
theoretical horizon we examine it, the house image would appear to have become the 
topography of our intimate being.’ (xxxvi).  
 
Walter Benjamin, as Peter Sloterdijk (2009) notes, offers a more historically and 
materially engaged take on the domestic interior, deploying the house (specifically 
interior decoration) as a tool not for the analysis of the timeless soul but, instead, of 
‘capitalist man in the 19th century’ (2). Even so, the home is viewed as a 
compensatory realm reflective of fantasy, sensory intoxication and the exclusion of 
the outside world of work and politics. The domestic interior, then, becomes not only 
the ‘plastic expression of the personality’ (2002: 20), it simultaneously illuminates 
‘the phantasmagoria of capitalist culture’ (2002: 8). Nineteenth century interior 
designs, ultimately, are analogous of modernity itself as ‘furnished man’ (2005: 5) 
sinks into his plush surroundings. 
 
Jean Baudrillard’s take on the domestic interior of later capitalism echoes Benjamin’s 
analysis in tracing the logic of capital that is seen to run through the desire to 
‘construct a world, a private totality’ (2005: 92), of which the collection is the 
privileged example. Objects, together with their systems, operate as mirrors, 
instruments aiding and abetting narcissistic projection: ‘as a mirror the object is 
perfect, precisely because it sends back not real images, but desired ones. In a word, it 
is a dog of which nothing remains but faithfulness.’ (96). The collector of objects, in 
attempting to possess them is in fact striving to secure him or herself: ‘the creation 
of a total environment, to that totalization of images of the self that is the basis of the 
miracle of collection. For what you really collect is always yourself.’ (97). 
 
The connection between narcissism and interior design is, needless to say, gendered 
and the association of the female body with the domestic sphere has a long history, 
becoming a commonplace by the start of the twentieth century (Briganti and Mezei, 
2013). Emily Burbank’s Woman as Decoration (1917), for instance, exemplifies the 
promotion of a convergence between a woman’s bodily appearance and her 
furnishings with chapter titles such as ‘Intelligent Expressing of Self in Mis-en-Scene’ 
and ‘Woman Decorative in Her Sun Room’ (in Briganti and Mezei, 2013). One of the 
most attentive novelists of the domestic interior, Edith Wharton provides a damning 
portrait of the woman-as-decoration furnishing phenomenon in The House of Mirth, 
not before having it both ways though, by offering her own design advice in The 
Decoration of Houses (Agnew, 2013). As Hermione Lee has shown, Wharton’s book 
had a ‘marked influence on house design in America’ (2008: 134), not to mention 
upon other designers. Elsie de Wolfe’s The House in Good Taste (1913), for instance, 
shared many of Wharton’s rather judgmental views on the ideal interior and was 
adamant in insisting that ‘a woman’s environment will speak for her whether she likes 
it or not’ (cited in Lee, 2008: 135). 
 
This idea of the house betraying its inhabitants, as Benjamin notes, inaugurates the 
birth of detective fiction (Highmore, 2002): Sherlock Holmes reads the interior for 
clues to a murder as ‘furnished man’ leave his physical, hence traceable, impression 
on the upholstery. As a character, Holmes offers an interesting reversal of tidy house, 
tidy mind logic, though, in the contrast between the clutter of his domestic space and 
the sparsely furnished scheme of his ‘brain-attic’ (2009a: 21). If, ‘in his personal 
habits one of the most untidy men that ever drove a fellow-lodger to distraction’ 
(2009: 372), Holmes, simultaneously, keeps his mind clear:  
 
I consider that a man’s brain originally is like a little empty attic, and you have 
to stock it with such furniture as you choose. A fool takes in all the lumber of 
every sort that he comes across, so that the knowledge which might be useful 
to him gets crowded out, or at best is jumbled up with a lot of other things… 
(2009a: 21) 
 
In stark contrast to James’ evolutionary idea of aggregated mind-stuff, Holmes likes 
things orderly and perpetually decluttered in his head, instead allowing a kind of 
fossil-record of congealed objects to form in his living quarters.  
 
Holmes’ untidy house/tidy mind disposition shares an affinity with Adam Phillip’s 
(2000) psychoanalytic reading of the Francis Bacon’s studio.  As part of Phillip’s 
therapeutic work with a young artist who complained of compulsively frustrating his 
own artistic practice by cluttering up his canvases, analyst and analysand debate the 
mess of the studio environment, drawing particular attention to the way in which the 
clotted hoard that formed the floor of Bacon’s studio space contrasts with the clarity 
of the subjects populating the canvas. If Bacon’s clutter was seen to work for him, 
then, the analysis pursued the question of how to use clutter to unblock the canvas for 
the analysand. The responsibility of Phillips as the analyst was to effectively hold the 
mess and resist the temptation to organize it into a convenient, ready-made 
psychoanalytic signscape. 
 
From an object-relations perspective (Winnicott), clutter provides the means for both 
defensive and creative action, inaugurating good and bad mess. On the one hand, it 
can serve to frustrate: ‘[Winnicott’s] false self personality, in his words, “collects 
demands” to clutter up his life: to baffle and evade his desire, to protect but starve his 
true self.’ (Phillips, 2000: 60) Whilst on the other, to elaborate a theme that remains 
implied in Phillips’ analytical method, the notion of transitional space is characterized 
as the provision of an appropriately messy, crucially physical and material, area 
between mother and child. If the child is to stand a chance of healthy individuation 
then they must be given the space to play, to experiment with not-me objects and 
possessions and, crucially, to make a mess (Winnicott, 1990). Transitional space is, 
then, necessarily cluttered and disorderly – at least from the adult’s point of view – 
and must remain so. Winnicott is clear about the prospective psychic damage that 
ensues should the adult fill the space with his or her own desires and needs: 
 
The potential space between baby and mother, between child and family, 
between individual and society or the world…can be looked upon as sacred to 
the individual in that it is here that the individual experiences creative living. 
By contrast, exploitation of this area leads to a pathological condition in which 
the individual is cluttered up with persecutory elements of which he has no 
means of ridding himself. (2005: 139) 
 
In other words, the good disorder of transitional space must not be ordered by anyone 
other than the child nor must it be cluttered up with desires or creative products and 
solutions not belonging to the child. Winnicott extends this warning to the figure of 
the analyst, who must remain a benign presence in the face of the analysand’s 
attempts to find their own path in the analysis. The good-enough analyst, like the 
good-enough mother must endeavor not to be too house-proud if they are to furnish 
the optimum environment for the patient. 
 
From object relations to object orientations 
For advocates of objects, object relations, nevertheless, has major shortcomings. 
Winnicott’s transitional mess with its vibrant account of the importance of material 
things (not-me experiences extend crucially into contact with not-human entities) 
tends to evaporate as even the optimum transitional object is gradually abandoned, 
leaving its composite escapades to somehow dissipate into culture (2005). In 
Winnicott’s reckoning, then, the material world is reduced to a series of props 
designed for human purposes of separation and individuation. As Ian Bogost would 
see it: ‘all existence is drawn through the sieve of humanity, the rich world of things 
discarded like chaff so thoroughly, so immediately, so efficiently that we don’t even 
notice.’ (2012: 3). Psychoanalytic tidiness thus creeps back into the scene of analysis 
as material, not-me things ultimately serve human purposes. In Phillips’ case study, 
especially, Freudian notions, such as reaction-formation, projection and introjection, 
shepherd the analysand’s mess back into the fold of analytical confidence (Buchanan, 
2014), leading, in the consideration of Bacon’s art, to a ‘kind of homology between 
the state of the studio and the work produced there’ (ibid, np, my emphasis). In other 
words, it all boils down to a logic of projection and introjection: Bacon projects the 
state of his mind onto his studio space and the analysand introjects the psychodrama 
of his bohemian upbringing and projects its frustrations onto his canvases. Either way, 
canvas and studio in the end serve as mirrors, reflecting inner, psychic turmoil and 
good mess is reduced to a matter of mind. 
 
For both Gregory Bateson (2000) and Karen Barad (2007), homologies, analogies and 
reflections make for exceptionally bad science in that they disavow the entanglement 
of the investigator – together with her or his apparatuses – in the scene of 
investigation. Critical of the foundational status of comparative anatomy in zoological 
theory, Bateson, for instance, undermines the idea of homology and analogy as a 
reliable means of exploring cultural similarities and differences. The mistakes of 
psychoanalysis, in particular, consist less in the identification of patterns in behaviour 
than in its tendency to present loose thinking ‘as more concrete’ than it is: ‘We are all 
familiar with this loose use of words in such phrases as: (…) “he was influenced by 
his emotions”; “his symptoms are the result of conflict between his superego and his 
id.”’ (82). As far as such words stay loose, operating as place holders – or knots in 
handkerchiefs to use Bateson’s image – indicating the need for further investigation, 
psychoanalysis has much to offer; masquerading as hardened fact, however, it 
becomes something altogether more contentious. 
 
Barad would agree, placing emphasis upon the performativity of scientific practice. 
Just as Bateson insists on perpetually reworking his anthropological apparatuses – the 
categories, concepts, rules and formulations that form the instruments of anthropology 
– so Barad insists upon the apparatus not only as an ‘open-ended’ practice (2007: 
817) but also as an entangling phenomenon of what she terms intra-activity (i.e 
proceeding from a position of inextricable involvement with what is isolated as a 
proposed ‘object’ of enquiry). If ‘boundaries do not sit still’ (ibid) then mirrors, 
reflections and analogies are profoundly unstable instruments capable of little more 
than distortion. 
 
What this means for a consideration of hoarding, above all, is that the clinical 
apparatus used to identify specific ‘cases’  – from its psychodramatic version to its 
more recent neurobiological configuration – is in need of major adjustment. The 
reliance upon a culturally diffuse mirror-logic not only places professionals and 
clinicians (and their equipment) outside of the clinical scenes they assess, it supports 
the illusion that the situation of hoarding is merely one involving flawed individuals 
and inert things. The grandiose idea that things exist for us and, more, that we are 
capable of separating ourselves cleanly from them is as powerful a fiction as that of 
tidy houses reflecting tidy minds. Bruno Latour, among others, questions the extent to 
which humans might achieve any clear separation from the nonhuman world, 
preferring, instead, to speak of an entirely enmeshed state of co-constitution: ‘we are 
sociotechnical animals…we are never limited to social ties. We are never faced with 
objects…. [Things] deserve better. They deserve to be housed in our intellectual 
culture as fully-fledged social actors. They mediate our actions? No, they are us.’ 
(1994: 64).  
 
Conclusion 
In the absence of any consideration of this entanglement, not least the social situation 
of an aggressive consumer culture that invests in new powers of magnetism and 
attraction, diagnostic frameworks are securing forced confessions. To extend the 
discourse of the police procedural, hoarders are literally being framed, i.e. held solely 
to account for crimes they didn’t commit, whilst their accomplices – the things that 
usually dominate the room – remain unconsidered and unquestioned. What this means 
for a consideration of the circumstances of Hoarding Disorder is that a crucial cohort 
– the constituents of the hoard itself – is missing from the investigation. By insisting 
upon a model of an autonomous human subject/addict that is discrete, clean and 
bounded, who, then, lapses into pathological relationships with things (throwing up 
mirror images of their psyches as they go), clinicians, pop psychologists and their 
followers produce a situation that results in blame and condemnation. The humans 
that are left to carry the can have little defence. In the words of one reality TV ‘case’ 
– labelled by the resident psychotherapist as prodigiously stubborn – in response to 
the question ‘what do you feel is an unresolved emotional issue in you?’: ‘I can’t 
answer that question’.10 
 
Nonetheless, the cultural dominance of ‘reflection as a pervasive trope for knowing’ 
(Barad, 2007: 72), not to mention its domestic incarnation ‘tidy house/tidy mind’ with 
its notion of a hermeneutic psychological truth buried in piles of stuff, is at the heart 
of the problem: as Diana Fuss notes, ‘ the modern fantasy that the domestic interior 
and all its furnishings illuminate the personality of its inhabitant is, of course, no less 
powerful or pervasive for being a fantasy’ (2004: 11). In short, if we are to do justice 
to the phenomenon of hoarding, and to consider its aetiology beyond simple stories of 
pathological humans, or even pathological capitalism, we must first dispense with the 
mirror 
 
Notes 
1		The	Hoarder	Next	Door	(2014)	Channel	4	[Premiered:	3	May	2012,	Series	3,	episode	5,	first	broadcast:	3	April	2014,	10pm)	
																																																								
																																																																																																																																																															
2	Hoarding:	Buried	Alive	(2010)	TLC	[premiered:	14	March	2010];	Hoarders	(2009)	A&E	[premiered:	17	August	2009];	Storage	Hoarders	(2012)	ITV1	[premiered:	10	December	2012];	Collectaholics,	(2014)	BBC2	[premiered:	12	March	2014];	America’s	Animal	Hoarder:	Horror	at	the	Zoo	(2012)	Channel	4	[first	broadcast:	9	August	2012];	Extreme	Car	Hoarders	(201)	Discovery	[premiered:	24	March	2014];	The	Horse	Hoarder	(2013)	Channel	4	[first	broadcast:	1	January	2013]		3	The	Hoarder	Next	Door	(2012)	Channel	4	[premiered	3	May	2012]			4	Making	Space	(2014)	4OD	[http://www.channel4.com/programmes/making-space/4od#2930697,	accessed	17	April	2014]		5	Hoarding:	Buried	Alive,	Episode	26,	"Like	a	Dog	in	a	Cage"	[First	broadcast:	April	13,	2011]			6	Advertisement	for	Harpic	2in1	toilet	blocks	is	viewable	here:		 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Pl9gvzuCe0	
Through	the	Keyhole	is	viewable	here:		 https://www.itv.com/itvplayer/through-the-keyhole		7	How	Clean	is	Your	House	(2003-2009)	Channel	4	[Premiered	May	21,	2003]	http://www.channel4.com/programmes/how-clean-is-your-house		8	Season	2,	episode	7,	first	broadcast	on	December	10	2012	http://www.itv.com/presscentre/ep26week38/storage-hoarders#.U3Tc96Unhg0.		
																																																																																																																																																															9	The	Hoarder	Next	Door	(2012)	http://www.channel4.com/programmes/the-hoarder-next-door/on-demand/56855-005	Series	3,	episode	5		10	ibid.			
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